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In this article we extend the recent literature on overlapping generations and
pollution by allowing each generation’s utility to depend on past levels of pollution.
To conform with the literature on habit in consumption we call this extension habit
in pollution. Habit in pollution can visualize itself as either a concern for the ﬂow
of pollution only, or for the stock, or anything in between.
We show that habit in pollution has not only signiﬁcant consequences for the
level of pollution and capital, but also for the evolution of utility over time. We
observe that habit in pollution can lead to violations of two standard criteria of
sustainability, which suggests that habit in pollution can be another source of in-
tergenerational inequity.
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1 Introduction
Economists have recently started to pay more and more attention to the intergenerational
aspects of environmental degradation (e.g. John and Pecchenino, 1994; Howarth, 1997;
Pezzey and Toman, 2002; Seegmuller and Verch` ere, 2004). If generations are able to
transfer the costs of their actions to the future, then this could deprive the latter of at
least some of the welfare, which theories of intergenerational equity would have prorated
to them. Our focus in this article is to characterize a diﬀerent source of intergenerational
inequity, one where one need not look to the deep future to observe violations of equity
criteria. This source of potential intergenerational inequity arises under a seemingly
favorable condition when generations are able to adapt to existing levels of pollution. In
line with the recent literature on bequeathed tastes we dub this habit in pollution.
We analyze the implications of habit in pollution in an overlapping generations framework
` a la John and Pecchenino (1994) and speciﬁcally Seegmuller and Verch` ere (2004). Past
levels of pollution are assumed to inﬂuence the way generations perceive the environment.
We model this in a general way by allowing the utility to be a function of either the changes
in pollution in one limit case, or, in the other limit case, utility will be a function of the
stock of pollution.
The new element, which we introduce, has similar properties as the habit factor in con-
sumption, which has seen some recent research by e.g. de la Croix (1996) and Wendner
(2002). However, habit in pollution can have a diﬀerent and larger variety of interpreta-
tions.
Firstly, habit in pollution could reﬂect the psychological adaptation to existing levels of
pollution. A simple example can illustrate this interpretation. A generation, born at a
certain point in time, will be born with an existing stock of pollution. However, this
generation will not know the world any diﬀerent. Hence, it will view the world it lives in
as one without pollution. So, the only eﬀect of pollution that this generation might feel
is the change in the pollution stock during the time of its existence. We generalize this
idea by allowing the generations to be concerned with either the stock of pollution, or
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the change in pollution during their lifetime, or anything in between. Secondly, habit in
pollution can reﬂect the way pollution is noticed in the environment. For example, some
pollutants are invisible or only occur in the ground, wherefore the general public might
not fully notice the level but only know the amount they emit each period. Lastly, habit
in pollution could refer to physical adaptation (where the factor would be very low and
pollution would be interpreted as bodily harm).
These interpretations may not be applicable at the same time and are depending on the
type of pollutant. Of these three interpretation, we shall utilize the ﬁrst one throughout
the article. Up to now there is no empirical research on whether habit in pollution exists
or not. However, Scitovsky (1992) provides evidence from psychology suggesting that
people respond to stimuli, i.e. changes, rather than levels. Similar arguments have been
forwarded by Madruga and da Silveira (2003), who suggest that “we are stressed out by
unprecedented levels of environmental (...) destabilization and somehow we are getting
used to it.” This argument captures what we describe as the psychological adaptation
eﬀect and seems to be the strongest argument in favor of habit in pollution.
One of our results is that habit in pollution bears signiﬁcant eﬀects upon the steady state
levels of pollution and capital. Our main result, however, is that habit in pollution can
have profound implications for intergenerational equity.
Overlapping generation models, even most continuous time growth models, augmented
with an environmental constraint (e.g. John and Pecchenino, 1994) possess clear dynam-
ics. Utility either increases or decreases over time given an optimal choice of consumption
and abatement. Only very few models actually create non-monotonic behaviour in form
of cycles and bifurcations (Br´ echet and Lambrecht, 2004; Seegmuller and Verch` ere, 2004).
In the case of Br´ echet and Lambrecht (2004), these bifurcations or cyclical behaviour are
a result of the choice of a speciﬁc resource function. They provide no attempt in trying
to explain the eﬀect of these cyclical dynamics on intergenerational equity. Seegmuller
and Verch` ere (2004) develop a similar model as we do, but with a utility function linear
in consumption1 and, most importantly, without a habit factor. Their main result is the
1However, they use a more general production function.
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possibility of a ﬂip bifurcation.
The interest in non-monotonic dynamics derives from an intergenerational equity point
of view. If some generations possess the capacity to reduce future generation’s utility
in relation to their own, then most theories of intergenerational equity demand policy
makers to act upon this behavior (e.g. egalitarianism). We are going to use an approach to
intergenerational equity which is becoming standard in today’s literature, namely to judge
the model’s implications upon its eﬀects on the sustainability of welfare. One criterion of
sustainability is Brundtland Sustainability, the other is Sustainable Development. We are
able to show that habit in pollution will, under rather wide ranges of parameter choices,
lead to violations of both criteria.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic features of the model
and derives the intertemporal equilibrium. Section 3 describes the dynamics. Section 4
reviews the results within the theory of intergenerational equity. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a perfectly competitive overlapping generations economy. We allow for per-
fect foresight and discrete time with an inﬁnite horizon, t = 0,1,2.... For simplicity we
assume that population is constant and each generation consists of a single representative
individual. At each date a generation lives for two periods, young and old. Furthermore,
the young generations supply their labour inelastically and decide whether to save or in-
vest (in abatement), and the old generations obtain utility from consuming their savings.
In addition, we assume that the old generations feel the eﬀects of pollution as a disutility,
but perceive pollution diﬀerently for the various reasons as laid out in the introduction.
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2.1 The Pollution Accumulation
Pollution is assumed to accumulate as described by the following equation
Pt+1 = (1 − b)Pt + βct − γAt, (1)
where b ∈ [0,1] is the rate of pollution absorption, β(> 0) is a parameter of consumption
externality, representing the rate of pollution emissions from a unit of consumption, and
γ(> 0) represents the eﬀectiveness of the abatement eﬀort, At, on pollution. Hence,
the stock of tomorrow’s pollution is partially depending on today’s pollution stock and is
being increased by consumption and reduced by abatement. What is important is the fact
that the costs of today’s consumption are transferred to tomorrow, which thus directly
addresses the issue of intergenerational cost transferal. Notice also that we do not assume
irreversibilities here.
Furthermore, we choose this pollution accumulation equation in preference for the envi-
ronmental accumulation function ` a la John and Pecchenino (1994) because we feel un-
comfortable with the assumption that the initial level of the environment must be above
the natural level.2
2.2 The Generations
Generations derive utility over consumption and pollution only when old. Their utility
function is of the form
U(ct+1,Pt+1,Pt) = lnct+1 − αln(Pt+1 − hPt), (2)
where ct+1 refers to (per capita) consumption in period t + 1, and Pt+1 and Pt refer to
the stock of pollution in periods t + 1 and t respectively3. 0 < α < 1 measures each
2John and Pecchenino (1994) had to introduce this assumption in order to obtain a maximum for the
ﬁrst order condition.
3For any Pt and Pt+1 there ∃ˆ h such that Pt+1 > ˆ hPt, ∀t. Throughout the paper we assume that
h ≤ ˆ h. We utilise this utility function in order to obtain simple and explicit solutions. Furthermore it
is the only one which ﬁts our assumptions. In addition, for 0 < Pt+1 − hPt < 1, the eﬀect of habit in
pollution is able to increase utility.
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generation’s relative preference for pollution over consumption.
Thus, we extend the literature by allowing generations to be aﬀected by past levels of
pollution. For h = 0, generations perceive only the stock of pollution, for h = 1 they are
only concerned with the ﬂow, and for 0 < h < 1 they are partly concerned with either.
Generations then maximize their utility with respect to savings and subject to their budget
constraints which are given by
wt − At = st, (3)
(1 + rt+1)st = ct+1, (4)
and the pollution accumulation equation (1). Here, w, A, s and r refer to the wages
obtained, the abatement eﬀort, the savings carried forward to the next period and the
interest obtained on the savings, respectively. The ﬁrst order condition from the genera-







This allows us to ﬁnd the maximum of utility as the utility function is strictly concave
with respect to savings, our variable of choice. The left-hand side of equation (5) gives the
marginal beneﬁt to utility of an additional unit of savings now, whereas the right-hand
side gives the marginal costs to utility of a change in habit in pollution. The lower the
relative preference of pollution with respect to consumption, as given by α, the more will
each generation save in order to obtain a higher level of consumption when old. Also,
the less each generation cares about the actual stock of pollution, i.e. a high h, the lower
the level of savings. Finally, as generations are not altruistic, they don’t take the eﬀect
of their consumption on next generation’s utility into account. Therefore, they are only
concerned with cleaning up some of the pollution their ancestors did. However, if they
notice that their abatement eﬀorts are not very eﬀective, thus γ is low, then they will
prefer to save more to obtain a higher level of consumption when old.
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2.3 The Representative Firm
The representative ﬁrm produces with a constant returns to scale technology, y = f(k)L,
where we normalise the labour supply to L = 1. We furthermore assume the standard
conditions f0(k) > 0 and f00(k) < 0. The ﬁrm then maximizes proﬁts in a competitive
market that clears, such that
f
0(kt+1) − δ = rt+1, (6)
f(kt) − f
0(kt)kt = wt, (7)
st = kt+1. (8)
We use the Cobb-Douglas output function to specify the production technology, with
f(k) = km, where m ∈ (0,1) is the capital share. Furthermore, we assume full deprecia-
tion, δ = 1, during the course of one period.
2.4 The Intertemporal Equilibrium
We ﬁrst deﬁne the intertemporal equilibrium of this economy.
Deﬁnition 1 Intertemporal equilibrium: The intertemporal equilibrium of the above de-
picted economy is a sequence {kt,Pt}∞
t=0 with given initial conditions {k0,P0} which sat-
isﬁes the two equations that rule the dynamics, (9) and (10).
By combining the ﬁrst order condition with the market clearing condition, the output
function, as well as the budget constraints and the pollution equation, we obtain
kt+1 = −
1 − b − h
γ(1 − α)
Pt −







h + bα − α
1 − α
Pt −





By taking kt = k and Pt = P, we derive the steady states of this economy. There exist
two steady states, one is trivial with {k,P} = (0,0). The other steady state is given by
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k =

(1 − h)(mβ + mγ − γ)




for mβ + mγ − γ 6= 0 and bα + h − 1 6= 0, where k > 0 provided that mβ + mγ − γ and





(1 − h)(mβ + mγ − γ)




Given the above reasoning, we shall from now on impose the following conditions.
Assumption 1 We impose that h < 1 − αb.
This assumption shows that there exists a constraint on the level of h. If this constraint
is violated then the generations adapt to existing levels of pollution so quickly that no
steady state will exist. In eﬀect, pollution will tend to inﬁnity. One could furthermore
take the case of long-lasting pollutants like climate change or nuclear waste, such that b is
very small. This would allow to focus the analysis on an extensive range for the parameter
of concern, h.
Assumption 2 We assume mβ + mγ − γ < 0.





. In general, the capital share is around
m = 1/3, which leads to β being less than twice the value of γ. In other words, we
allow that it takes less eﬀort to pollute than to clean up. In addition, we notice that this
assumption is consistent with a wide range of parameters for m, β and γ and is required
for the existence of positive steady states.
The eﬀect of habit in pollution on the steady state can be discovered by taking the





(1 − h)(1 − m)(bα + h − 1)
> 0. (13)
Based on our Assumptions 1 and 2, the steady state capital stock increases with increases
in the habit parameter, h. Obviously, if generations perceive the stock of pollution to be
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lower than it actually is, they will feel less concerned with it and thus produce more and
abate less.









bα + h − 1

> 0. (14)
Hence habit in pollution, h, will always increase the steady state stock of pollution4.
Intuitively, if generations are less concerned with the actual stock of pollution, they will
be willing to trade oﬀ a higher stock of pollution for a higher capital stock. This suggests
that if generations adapt too fast to the stock of pollution such that mostly changes in
pollution drive their utility, then they will allow pollution to accumulate without bound.
3 The Dynamics
By linearizing equations (9) and (10) around the non-trivial steady state we obtain the
dynamics around the steady state.
We study a special case, where the regeneration of the nature itself is negligible, such that
b = 0. This can be applied to various types of persistent organic pollutants, to nuclear
waste or several long-lasting greenhouse gases. Then the pollution accumulation is given
by
Pt+1 = Pt + βct − γAt.
In this case, the characteristic function is
(1 − α)λ
2 − (h + m − α)λ + mh,
with h < 1. The eigenvalues are given by
λ1,2 =
(h + m − α) ±
p
(h + m − α)2 − 4mh(1 − α)
2(1 − α)
. (15)
4A suﬃcient condition for this is given by our assumption that b ∈ (0,1) and α < 1.
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As one can easily see, equation (15) allows for positive, negative as well as complex
eigenvalues. The full conditions characterizing the dynamics can be found in the Appendix
for reference only. However, as we would like to analyze the dynamics for their implications
on intergenerational equity, we shall focus on the complex case. The following Proposition
shows under which circumstances complex eigenvalues will appear.
Proposition 1 If the parameter combination is such that h1 < h < h2 and α+m−2mα >
0, then the system’s orbit around the non-trivial steady state (k,P) is oscillatory, with
h1 = (α + m − 2mα) − 2
p
αm(1 − α)(1 − m),
h2 = (α + m − 2mα) + 2
p
αm(1 − α)(1 − m).
Proof 1 See Appendix.
3.1 Interpretation of the complex dynamics
We notice that, at the intertemporal equilibrium, changes in capital and pollution are
non-monotonic for certain parameter combinations due to the interplay of two elements:
Firstly, the savings of the old (st) are utilized to produce the wages of the young and the
consumption of the old (ct+1). This transformation is subject to decreasing returns (as
f00(k) < 0). The second element is a direct result of the habit in pollution. For 0 < h < 1,
generations are partly able to adapt to existing stocks of pollution (Pt+1−hPt), wherefore
they are spending less money on abatement and more on consumption. From a certain
level of capital stock onwards, the additions to savings are so small that the increases
in pollution outweigh the advantages from higher savings (st). Therefore, the generation
spends more money on abatement (At), which reduces savings (st). This reduction has a
two-fold impact. Firstly, the reduction in savings (st) reduces next periods capital stock
(kt+1) and thus consumption (ct+1) and the pollution stock of the consecutive period
(Pt+2); secondly, the increase in abatement (At) reduces the stock of pollution (Pt+1).
Assuming the parameter combination that leads to complex dynamics, the next generation
is now in a position where they view the eﬀect of pollution on their utility (Pt+2−hPt+1) as
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suﬃciently small, which leads them to reduce abatement and increase savings. Depending
on the parameter combinations, this adjustment process can be convergent, explosive or
even lead to endogenous cycles of period two.
Figure 1: Stability conditions for m = 1/3
We use Figure 1 to show the combinations of h and α which lead to oscillations. In
addition, Figure 1 visualizes under what parameter conﬁgurations one can expect stability
and instability. The legend on the right-hand side explains which area is meant by which
point of Proposition 1 (as well as the stability conditions given in the appendix).
This model, though seemingly simple, is rather rich in dynamics. It allows for positive,
negative as well as complex eigenvalues, which permits various types of solution paths.
Area A and B show the combinations of h ∈ (0,1) and α ∈ (0,1) which lead to asymptotic
stability, whereas areas C and D give the combinations leading to instability. The three
lines labeled bifu are the parameter combinations that lead to bifurcations. The large oval
area made by the thick, dashed line is the case of complex eigenvalues. For the case of
10Habit in Pollution: A Challenge for Intergenerational Equity
complex eigenvalues, the steady states to the left of the line bifu, 1−α
m , are asymptotically
stable, and the ones on the right are instable. One general observation is that the larger
is m the more stable will the system be for small h and large α and less stable for large
h and smaller α. The more we care about pollution relatively to consumption the more
unlikely will be a stable steady state.
The case of bifucations has been well explained by Seegmueller and Verch` ere (2004). The
consequences of instability are intuitive. In the following section we are therefore going
to focus on the case of stability with complex eigenvalues and we shall utilize this case to
highlight the consequences for intergenerational equity.
4 Welfare Analysis and Intergenerational Equity
As suggested in the previous section, habit in pollution can cause oscillatory dynamics
for a large range of parameter values. Our focus in this section will then be to emphasize
the implications of oscillatory dynamics on two widely used criteria of intergenerational
equity. One criterion is Brundtland Sustainability, the other is Sustainable Development5.
The ﬁrst notion of sustainability, Brundtland Sustainability, was shaped in 1987 in the
United Nations report Our Common Future, more commonly referred to as the Brundt-
land Report. The most widely quoted sentence of this report is that sustainability should
be thought of as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
the future generations to meet their own needs”. However, this sentence, on its own, is not
a complete account of what the Brundtland Report has in mind by sustainability. The
report furthermore suggests that sustainability “(...) requires meeting the basic needs
of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulﬁll their aspirations for a better life.”
(Brundtland Report, p. 24) The second part of this interpretation of sustainability seems
to have been neglected in today’s literature. It is more closely connected to the new egali-
tarian thinking on capability and responsibility (see e.g. Roemer, 1996). It is nevertheless
5We are aware that the Brundtland report originally called its criterion Sustainable Development.
However, here we follow recent expositions by Gosseries (2005) and Pezzey (1997).
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not clear though, how we are to interpret the request to “extend to all the opportunity
to fulﬁll their aspirations” in terms of an economic approach to intergenerational equity.
One interpretation could be that meeting the basic needs suﬃces and does not require
further redistributions (see Pezzey, 1997). This is clearly a suﬃcientarian notion of justice.
This theory of justice suggests that a distribution is just if all basic needs are covered.
This then can be rewritten in utility terms, where it comes to denote that a minimum of
utility, ut ≥ u, is to be obtained for all subsequent, indeﬁnite number of generations. We
shall have this interpretation in mind when we refer to Brundtland Sustainability in the
subsequent paragraphs.
Deﬁnition 2 A path of utility {u(t)}∞
t=0 conforms with the Brundtland Sustainability
criterion if ut ≥ u, ∀t, where u > 0 is a minimum level of utility.
Another interpretation could be as follows: if we were to stay within the boundaries of
this model, then each generation will have the same aspirations - maximizing their utility.
Given rationality and perfect foresight6 this implies that every generation should obtain
at least the same level of utility as their ancestors did7. This is a much stronger demand
than Brundtland Sustainability and - at least in our model - is closely connected to our
second notion of sustainability. However, as this second interpretation of Brundtland
Sustainability adds nothing more to our analysis, we shall leave it aside.
The second notion, Sustainable Development, is by now the predominant notion used
in economic analysis (Solow, 1974; Daly and Cobb, 1994; Pezzey, 1997) as well as egal-
itarian thinking, but nonetheless not free of controversy. In economic terms it has been
interpreted to mean that a certain level (or development) of utility is to be achieved. This
has been taken to imply that ∂ut
∂t ≥ 0, for all following time periods. Hence a world in
which this criteria is utilized is one in which utility is either kept constant or increases
over time, but is not reduced.
6Plus abstracting from various issues like population changes, changes in bundles of goods transferred
between generations, etc.
7The part “at least the same level of utility” comes from the fact that capital is productive, r(t) > 0.
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Deﬁnition 3 A path of utility {u(t)}∞
t=0 conforms with the Sustainable Development cri-
terion if ∂ut
∂t ≥ 0, ∀t.
We are now going to study the evolution of utility in order to understand which of the
two criteria of sustainability are satisﬁed within our model. The following proposition
summarizes the motion of utility at the intertemporal equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The level of utility at the intertemporal equilibrium can be expressed as
a function of the optimal capital stock only. In particular, the utility level is either pro-
cyclical (if m > α) or counter-cyclical (if m < α) depending on the relative importance of
pollution in generating utility.
Proof 2 For the proof we utilize the utility function of each generation. We have that
utility is equal to u(·) = ln(ct+1)−αln(Pt+1 −hPt) and we substitute ct+1 = (1+rt+1)st,
which equals mkm
t+1, and we substitute the FOC. Thus we get ln(mkm
t+1)−αln(αγkt+1) =
(m−α)ln(kt+1)+ln( m
(αγ)α). Hence, utility at the intertemporal equilibrium can be written
as a function of the capital stock only. If m < α then utility is counter-cyclical, and for
m > α utility will be pro-cyclical.
Proposition 2 thus allows us to see that utility, at the intertemporal equilibrium, can be
written as u(k,P(k)). Thus utility follows the motion of capital at the intertemporal
equilibrium. Figure 2 describes the motion of utility at the intertemporal equilibrium for
the case of complex eigenvalues and the steady state case8.
It is possible to observe that generations will face diﬀerent levels of utility depending on
when they are born. If we assume that a policy maker assesses intergenerational equity by
comparing the motion of utility at the intertemporal equilibrium with the requirements
of the Sustainable Development criterion, then the oscillatory motion of utility at the
intertemporal equilibrium prevents achieving this equity target without adequate policy
8We use the following parameter combinations for the simulations: b = 0, h = 0.85, γ = 0.2, α = 0.7,
m = 0.3, β = 0.35.
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Figure 2: Motion of utility at the intertemporal equilibrium
interventions. These interventions could for example take the form of intergenerational
transfers9. If we assume that a policy maker assesses intergenerational equity by com-
paring the motion of utility at the intertemporal equilibrium with the requirements of
the Brundtland Sustainability criterion, then the result is far less clear. What we can
say, however, is that besides the level of minimum utility, the initial conditions as well as
the level of the habit in pollution parameter h and α play the predominant roles. The
closer the parameter combination of h and α is to the parameter combination that leads
to bifurcations, the larger the oscillations of utility at the intertemporal equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
In this article we extend the recent literature on overlapping generations and pollution by
allowing generations to have habit in pollution. This can be interpreted as a psychological
adaptation to existing levels of pollution and visualizes itself as a concern for the ﬂow of
pollution only, or for the stock, or anything in between.
9Arguments questioning the possibility of intergenerational transfers can be found in Lind (1995).
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The eﬀect of habit on the steady state level of pollution and capital is rather profound.
The larger the habit factor, i.e. the more the generations only focus on the changes in
pollution during their lifetime, the larger the steady state levels of pollution and capital.
Most importantly, if generations are only concerned with the ﬂow of pollution, then
pollution will be accumulated without bound.
In addition to aﬀecting the steady state levels of pollution and capital, habit in pollution
also aﬀects the way in which these steady state levels are reached. Whereas overlapping
generation models without habit in pollution usually have monotonic dynamics (e.g. John
and Pecchenino (1994)), our extension allows for a wide range of dynamics to occur.
We ﬁnd that for large choices of parameters the agent’s behavior at the intertemporal
equilibrium can lead to oscillations in utility of subsequent generations.
We analyze these oscillations for their eﬀect on two standard criteria of intergenerational
equity, Brundtland Sustainability and Sustainable Development.
In case these oscillations are to occur, then Sustainable Development will be impossible
to achieve without adequate policy interventions. Furthermore, whether the Brundtland
Sustainability criterion will be satisﬁed depends on the level of the minimum utility, the
initial conditions as well as the level of the habit parameter and the relative importance
of pollution in generating utility.
Our results can be slightly generalized. When a model generates endogenous cycles then
both predominantly used criteria of intergenerational equity, Brundtland Sustainability
as well as Sustainable Development, can be easily violated in case there are no policy
interventions. This thus requires a certain trade-oﬀ between the value that generations
place on eﬃciency, and the value that a policy maker places on intergenerational equity.
Habit in pollution is evidently a challenging extension for standard OLG models of the
environment and deserves greater attention in consecutive research. Especially interesting
would be to see whether empirical evidence is able to support this adaptive behavior of
the agents, how a policy maker could aﬀect this behavior and how forward-looking the
policy maker must be in order to avoid the intergenerational inequities.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Notice that
∆(h) =
(h + m − α)2 − 4mh(1 − α)
2(1 − α)
is the term under the square root of equation (15). To ﬁnd the conditions under which
∆(h) < 0 we equate ∆(h) with 0 and solve for h
0 = h
2 + 2h(2mα − α − m) + (α − m)
2,
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which has roots
h = (α + m − 2mα) ±
p
(α + m − 2mα)2 − (α − m)2
= (α + m − 2mα) ±
p
α(1 − α)m(1 − m),
which are always real, for any 0 < α < 1 and 0 < m < 1, except at α = m
2m−1.
Denote
h1 = (α + m − 2mα) −
p
(α + m − 2mα)2 − (α − m)2,
h2 = (α + m − 2mα) +
p
(α + m − 2mα)2 − (α − m)2.
So for the given α and m, 0 < h1 < h2 ≤ 1. Then we can see that if ∆(h) < 0, the
eigenvalues will be complex. 
The complete conditions describing the dynamics
Let h ∈ (0,h1) ∪ (h2,1), if furthermore, 0 < m < 1, for any α ∈ (0,1), with α 6= m
2m−1,
and
(1) h checks max{α − m,0} < h < min{1,2 − α − m}, the nontrivial steady state is
asymptotic stable.
(2) if min{1,2 − α − m} = 2 − α − m , when 2 − α − m < h < 1, the nontrivial steady
state is instable
(3) and at h = 2 − α − m, there is a Flip bifurcation.
(B) Let 1 > m > 1
2, 1 > α > m
2m−1(> m) and h ∈ (0,h1) ∪ (h2,1),
(4) and h checks α − m > h > max{ 2α
1+m − 1,3α − 2 − m}, then the nontrivial steady
state is asymptotic stable.
(5) If max{ 2α
1+m − 1,3α − 2 − m} = 3α − 2 − m, and h ≤ 3α − 2 − m , the nontrivial
steady state is instable. If max{ 2α
1+m − 1,3α − 2 − m} = 2α
1+m − 1, and h < 2α
1+m − 1
the nontrivial steady state is instable.
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(6) At h = 2α
1+m − 1, there is a Flip bifurcation.
(C) Let α − m > h and h ∈ (0,h1) ∪ (h2,1). Suppose that 0 < m < 1/2 and m < α < 1;
or 1/2 < m and m < α < m
2m−1.
(7) If h checks α−m > h > max{ 2α
1+m −1,3α−2−m}, then the nontrivial steady state
is asymptotic stable.
(8) If max{ 2α
1+m −1,3α−2−m} = 3α−2−m, and h ≤ 3α−2−m , then the nontrivial
steady state is instable. If max{ 2α
1+m − 1,3α − 2 − m} = 2α
1+m − 1, and h < 2α
1+m − 1
the nontrivial steady state is instable.
(9) If max{ 2α
1+m − 1,3α − 2 − m} = 2α
1+m − 1, then at h = 2α
1+m − 1, there is a Flip
bifurcation.
(10) Complex eigenvalue case. See Proposition 1 in the main text. Also, denote h∗ = 1−α
m ,
if α and m such that h1 < h∗ < h2, then if h1 < h < h∗, the steady state is
asymptotically stable; if h∗ < h < h2, the steady state is instable; if h = h∗, there
is a Flip Bifurcation.
Proof: Can be obtained from the authors upon request.
The condition on positive abatement can be derived as follows: As At = wt − st
and st = kt+1, we can then substitute the solutions wt = f(k) − f0(k)k as well as the





t . The coeﬃcient on pollution is always positive, so a suﬃcient condition for
positive abatement is 0 ≤ (1 − m) +
mβ+mγ−γ
γ(1−α) , which implies that γ ≤
mβ
α(1−m).
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